Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game

We study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource (CPR) game. We consider three types of agents: cooperators, defectors and enforcers. The role of enforcers is to punish defectors for overharvesting the resource. Agents are located on a circle and they only observe the actions of their two nearest neighbors. Their payoffs are determined by both local and global interactions and they modify their actions by imitating the strategy in their neighborhood with the highest average payoffs on average. Using theoretical and numerical analysis, we find a large diversity of equilibria to be the outcome of the game. In particular, we find conditions for the occurrence of equilibria in which the three strategies coexist. We also derive the stability of these equilibria. Finally, we show that introducing resource dynamics in the system favors the occurrence of cooperative equilibria.      

Why did the average duration of unemployment become so much longer?

There has been a substantial increase in the average duration of unemployment relative to the unemployment rate in the U.S. over the last 30 years. We evaluate the performance of a standard job-search model in explaining this phenomenon. In particular, we examine whether the increase in within-group wage inequality and the decline in the incidence of unemployment can account for the increase in unemployment duration. The results indicate that these two changes can explain a significant part of the increase over the last 30 years, although the model fails to match the behavior of unemployment duration during 1980s.     

Do People Accurately Anticipate Sanctions?

We provide lab data from four different games that allow us to study whether people have accurate expectations regarding monetary sanctions (punishment/reward) and nonmonetary sanctions (disapproval/approval). Although the strength of the sanction is always predicted with some error (particularly in the case of monetary sanctions), we observe that (i) most subjects anticipate correctly the sign of the average sanction, (ii) expectations covary with sanctions, (iii) the average expectation is very often not significantly different than the average actual sanction, and (iv) the errors exhibit no systematic bias, except in those situations where rewards are frequent. In this line, we find some evidence that punishment is better anticipated than rewards.     

Commonalities in the order book

This paper uses data from one of the most important European stock markets and shows that, in line with predictions from theoretical market microstructure, a small number of latent factors captures most of the variation in stock specific order books. We show that these order book commonalities are much stronger than liquidity commonality across stocks. The result that bid and ask side as well as the visible and hidden parts of the order book exhibit quite specific dynamics is interpreted as evidence that open order book markets attract a heterogeneous trader population in terms of asset valuations and impatience. Quantifying the informational content of the extracted factors with respect to the evolution of the asset price, we find that the factor information shares are highest (about 10%) for less frequently traded stocks. We also show that the informational content of hidden orders is limited.

Dimensions of uncertainty and their moderating effect on new product development project performance

In this study, we measure the dimensions of uncertainty, starting from the definitions constructed for and generally used in innovation projects. We then evaluate their direct and indirect effects on the performance of product and service development projects. Four dimensions of uncertainty are delimited with satisfactory validity and reliability, suggesting a differential moderating effect of the four types of uncertainty (technical and project uncertainty, market uncertainty, fuzziness and complexity) depending on the performance dimension (effectiveness and efficiency) and co‐moderator (project methods and human resource adequacy). Of the four dimensions explored, technical and project, and market uncertainty are true moderators and have the largest interactive effect, fuzziness has a strong direct effect on both performance dimensions whereas complexity weakly directly influences effectiveness. The latter two also influence the relations between performance and the factors related to human resources and project management methods.     

Beyond ideological cleavages: A unifying framework for industrial policies and other public interventions

This paper introduces a new framework to characterize the diversity of public policies and interventions to spur investment and growth. Going beyond ideological cleavages on this topic, we argue that two orthogonal features determine how much interventions depart fundamentally from neutral policies: (1) their degree of selectivity (in terms of sectors or other targeted categories of firms) and (2) the extent of price subsidies embedded in such interventions. These two characteristics of interventions respond to different types of justifications, and they do not necessarily need to go hand in hand, even if they often do in practice. Depending on their selectivity and/or the extent of price subsidies, interventions are shown to vary in their distortions, their benefits, and their opportunity costs. The framework is used to illustrate how different country characteristics affect these pros and cons of interventionism. In particular, we look at the effects of the initial state of the investment climate, the country's institutional capacity, its political economy context and the nature of the State-business interaction. Using the examples of poor countries with a small undiversified industrial base, we show that it is often in the situations where interventions may be the most needed, that the conditions for their success are likely to be the weakest, which does not mean either that some interventions cannot succeed in low-income countries.     

Looking Forward to Performance Improvement: A Field Test of the Feedforward Interview for Performance Management

This study examines the effectiveness of the feedforward interview for improving the job performance of employees relative to a traditional performance appraisal interview in a business equipment firm. Managers (n = 25) were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. Employees (n = 70) who engaged in a feedforward interview with their manager were observed by an anonymous peer to perform significantly better on the job four months later than employees (n = 75) who received the company's traditional performance appraisal interview. The finding that the feedforward intervention increased performance relative to the performance appraisal indicates that the effect is a relatively enduring one. The results suggest that the feedforward interview should prove useful for human resource managers who are searching for ways to increase the performance of their organization's human resources over and above the traditional performance appraisal. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.